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Abstract 
 This paper examines the impact of recent financial liberalization in China on the financing constraints of 
publicly-listed Chinese firms with and without politically-connected CEO/Chairman. Two continuous indices are 
used to measure the evolution and intensity of financial reforms: a financial liberalization index and a capital control 
index. The results indicate that while firms without politically-connected CEO/Chairman face significant financing 
constraints and politically-connected firms do not, financial liberalization has reduced the constraints for the former. 
Similarly, lower capital control in China’s equity market lessens credit constraints for non-connected firms. No 
statistically-significant impact of financial liberalization is detected with regards to firms that have CEO/Chairman 
with powerful political background.  
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1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
Most emerging markets initiated reforms in their domestic financial system and opening up 
capital accounts in the 1990s.  Financial integration with the global economy is supposed to 
enhance economic growth by promoting supply of savings, improving efficiency of allocation of 
funds, and facilitating risk sharing. However, financial crises taking place in many of these 
emerging markets in the 1990s and 2000s have raised questions on the assumed benefits of the 
liberalization. Moreover, empirical studies have produced inconclusive evidence on the impact 
of financial liberalization on economic growth. These studies primarily use country-level data. 
Kose et al. (2006) suggest that using micro data is more suitable in discovering specific channels 
of the relationship and is therefore more useful to policy lessons. 
This paper, using Chinese firm-level data, is a study of a specific mechanism on which 
financial liberalization can affect growth. We examine the impact of recent financial reforms and 
political connection in China on the financing constraints of publicly-listed firms. China, despite 
its tremendous growth for the last three decades and rising importance in the global economy, 
has only recently begun reforming its financial system and integrating its financial markets into 
the regional and global structures. There has been no systematic research on the impact of such 
financial reforms on the performance of enterprises in China. 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) suggest that when there is no financial friction, firms’ capital 
structure is inconsequential to their value. Under the assumption of perfect capital markets, 
internal and external funds are perfect substitutes and firms’ investment is made independently 
of their financing choice. In practice, informational asymmetries and agency cost give rise to 
financial frictions and, therefore, firms face higher cost of external financing. Firms are then 
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considered financially constrained when their investment decisions depend on the available 
internal funds. 
 Developing and transitional economies engage in financial reforms to improve the efficiency 
of their capital markets. Such reform measures as interest rate liberalization and reduction in 
entry barriers to the banking sector promote domestic savings; promotion of prudential 
regulations and scaling down of direct credit can lead to more efficient capital allocation. 
Further, opening up the domestic financial markets to foreign investors and liberalizing the 
capital accounts can attract more productive money that contributes to the overall pool of funds 
available for domestic investment.1  
Schiantarelli (1996) contains a detailed review of earlier studies on the effect of financial 
liberalization on the credit constraints of firms in emerging markets. Some of the more recent 
studies are summarized in Table 1. A common feature of these studies is that they focus on a 
subset of firms that would likely be subjected to external financing constraints and examine how 
the financial reforms have affected these firms. The grouping criteria include size, age, business 
group and bank affiliation, dividend-payout behaviour. For example, Jaramillo et al. (1996) find 
that small and young firms in Ecuador were financially constrained while large and old firms 
were not. The financial reforms introduced in Ecuador in the 1980s did not help relaxing the 
constraints for small and young firms. Koo and Maeng (2005) show that financial liberalization 
in South Korea reduces credit constraints for small and non-chaebol firms but not for large and 
chaebol firms.  
                                                          
1 However, it has been suggested that such external liberalization measures, as part of the financial globalization 
process, can make some countries more prone to crisis due to over-borrowing and moral hazard (McKinnon and Pill, 
1997) and volatile short-term capital flows (Kose et al., 2006). 
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Political connection of the CEO and Chairman of the board of directors of the firm has not 
been used as a sample-splitting criterion. This institutional feature is particularly important in 
China. Chinese firms, large or small, private or state-owned, finance their investment primarily 
from bank credits. Banks’ lending behavior very often is a legacy of that of state banks and 
mentality from the planned economy in the past, which were based on personal and political 
connections. Moreover, despite increasing importance of the private sector in the economy, 
many large and important firms in China remain tightly under the government control; their 
business serves not only national economic policies but also political objectives.  
There have been studies that look at the how the political connection of important 
management personnel gives rise to different corporate behavior or performance outcome. 
Faccio et al. (2006) show that politically-connected firms in 35 countries, China not included, are 
more likely to be bailed out when they face financial difficulties than similar non-connected 
firms. Johnston and Mitton (2003) look at how capital controls in Malaysia in September 1998, a 
one-time policy measure instituted in response to the Asian financial crisis, affect stock market 
valuation of Malaysian firms with and without political ties to the Prime Minister. Fan et al. 
(2007) examine how listed firms in China with and without politically-connected CEOs perform 
after IPO in terms of stock returns, earnings growth, sales growth, and returns on sales. 
Our paper examines the impact of financial reforms, including opening up stock market to 
foreign investors, in China on listed firms’ investment constraints, taking into account the 
political background of the firm’s CEO/Chairman. There has been no study on this particular 
topic.  
We discuss the empirical methods and data in Section 2. Section 3 contains results. 
Concluding remarks follow in Section 4. 
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2. EMPIRICAL METHODS AND DATA 
The investment model in this paper is based closely on Forbes (2007), Harrison et al. (2004), 
Love (2003), and Laeven (2003). In this model, each firm is assumed to maximize its present 
value, which is equal to the sum of discounted expected dividends, subject to capital 
accumulation and external financing constraints. The optimization problem is: 
  0 11
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t s s
t t t t t s t s
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where Kt is the capital stock at the beginning of period; ξt is a productivity shock; Dt is the 
dividend; Et[.] is the expectation operator conditional on information at time t; β is a discount 
factor; Π(.) is the profit function; C(.) is the adjustment cost function; It is investment over period 
t; and δ is the capital depreciation rate.  
Let λt be the multiplier for the non-negativity constraint on dividends, the first-order condition 
is: 
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Define marginal Q as the increase in the firm’s value from one extra unit of capital:  
1
t
t
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Then the envelope condition is:  
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Equations (5) and (7) are then combined to produce the Euler equation: 
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The ratio  11 /1t t   is the relative shadow cost of external funds in period t+1 versus t. 
In a world without financial friction, 1t t   . If the shadow cost of external financing is higher 
at t than at t+1, then the firm is deemed financially constrained.  
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1999) show that if production takes the form of a Cobb-Douglas 
function then the marginal profit of capital (MPK) can be written as: 
0 1,it i t
it
SalesMPK
K
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where 0i is firm’s fixed effect, 1,t is the ratio of capital’s share in production to the mark-up, 
and Sales denote total sale revenue.  
Let the relative shadow cost of external funds be a function of firm’s cash stock at the 
beginning of period:  
1
0 1
1
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i
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K
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Next, we assume the following adjustment cost function: 
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where 1 and 2 are constant and i  firm i’s fixed effect. It follows that the marginal adjustment 
cost of investment is: 
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Note that in this function the adjustment cost is linearly homogeneous in capital and investment.   
A first-order Taylor approximation around the means is used to linearize the Euler equation 
(8) and by letting  11 /1 1t tE     , we obtain a baseline investment equation that will be 
used to investigate financing constraints: 
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where fi  is the firm-specific effect and εit is the white-noise error term. 
When the firms’ investment responds positively to an increase in internal funds, they are 
considered credit-constrained. Hence, under the null hypothesis of no financing constraints, α3 ≤ 
0. If firms face financing constraints, then α3 > 0. Equation (13) can be modified to take into 
account the possibility that political background of the firm’s CEO/Chairman influences its 
access to external credits and therefore financing constraints: 
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where Pol and NonPol are dummy variables indicating, respectively, the firm has a 
CEO/Chairman with and without powerful political background.  
To examine the impact of financial liberalization on firms’ financing constraint, we 
incorporate a financial liberalization index (FLI) and a capital control index (CCI) into Equation 
(14): 
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These equations can be augmented with additional variables to control for other firm-level 
effects. 
There are some estimation issues with Equations (13-16): firm-specific effects, possible 
endogeneity of the regressors, and presence of the lagged dependent variable. To deal with these 
issues, we use GMM-difference dynamic panel estimator developed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991). This estimation method first-differences each variable to eliminate the firm-specific 
effects and then uses the lagged levels of the variables as their instruments. 
We obtain financial data for Chinese firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
markets from the Worldscope database. Financial and services firms are excluded. Extreme 
outliers for the key variables in Equation (1) are excluded. We use the financial data from the 
Worldscope database to maintain consistency in terms of data construction, variable definition, 
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and quality with recent studies on other emerging markets. Table 2 contains definition of the 
variables used in the regression analysis. 
As for the indicator of firm’s political connection, we identify the CEO and Chairman of the 
board of directors of each firm in the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) 
database and examine their biography. When no CEO/Chairman is identified for a given firm in 
CSMAR, we then try to locate the information via Sina Finance website.2 If biographical 
information or the name of the CEO/Chairman is missing from these sources, the firm is 
excluded from our sample. A firm is considered politically-connected if its CEO/Chairman is or 
was a government official or a military officer or someone with a political ranking at the 
provincial or ministerial level. Since the CEO/Chairman appointment is around 3 years, we 
combine the information on the political background based on the year 2007 with firms’ 
financial data for 2005-2007 in Worldscope.3 Our unbalanced sample contains 3,585 firm-year 
observations and up to 1,347 firms. 
Table 3 provides some summary statistics for investment, sales, and cash, all scaled by 
capital stock. In each cell, the first number is the value averaged over 2005-2007 whereas the 
number in the parentheses is the standard deviation. While firms without political ties generate 
greater sales per unit of capital they also hold more cash relative to politically connected firms. 
Unconnected firms may hold cash in anticipation of higher investment in the future or as a 
precaution against liquidity constraints. This possibility is examined in the sensitivity analysis.  
                                                          
2 See http://finance.sina.com.cn. 
3 The CSMAR database includes biographical information of the CEO/Chairman only from 2004, and the data 
coverage for more recent years is relatively better. Therefore, we select the year 2007 to compile the indicator of 
firm’s political connection.   
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To investigate the effects of financial reforms on firms’ credit constraints, we use the 
financial liberalization index and capital control index constructed in Chan, Dang, and Yan 
(2010).4 The FLI tracks reform measures in five categories: interest rate liberalization, reduction 
of entry barriers into the banking sector, decreases in directed credit, promotion of prudential 
regulations, and privatization of state banks. These categories are consistent with those 
considered in Laeven (2003) and Yi and Ding (2007).  A principal component analysis is applied 
to these categories. The first component accounts for more than 80 percent of the variance in the 
data and is used as the financial liberalization index (FLI). Higher values of the FLI indicate 
more liberalized financial regime. The FLI is a continuous measure that better reflects the nature 
of financial liberalization process that usually takes place gradually and may involve standstills 
or even reversals. It can also capture the intensity of financial reforms that a one-time binary 
indicator such as that in Laeven (2003) cannot. Chan, Dang, and Yan (2010) provide a more 
detailed description of how the FLI is constructed. 
The capital control index, proposed by Edison and Warnock (2003), represents the portion of 
the domestic equity not available to foreign investors. We adopt this method because it produces 
another continuous measure of financial liberalization from a different perspective and in a 
different segment of the financial system. The CCI captures the intensity of capital controls in 
the equity market; lower values of the CCI indicate less restriction. It is shown in Edison and 
Warnock (2003) that the CCI corresponds well with the liberalization dates in many emerging 
markets studied in Bekaert and Harvey (2000); the CCI is also comparable to the restriction-
                                                          
4  The paper can be downloaded from our website. The construction method of the FLI index is also available upon 
request. 
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based measure in Quinn (1997). Figures 1 and 2 depict the FLI and CCI for 1993-2007. The 
correlation between the two series is -0.91. 
3. RESULTS 
a. The Baseline Model 
     The main empirical results are shown in Table 4. They are obtained by dynamic GMM panel 
estimation method in Arellano and Bond (1991). To control for unobserved individual effects 
and possible endogeneity due to the presence of the lagged dependent variable, Equations (13)-
(16) are estimated in the first difference and a maximum of 2 lags of the explanatory variables 
are used as instruments. For each regression, we report the Wald statistic for testing the joint-
significance of the explanatory variables and z-statistic for testing the null hypothesis of no 
second-order serial correlation in the residuals. The reported regression results are obtained by 
two-step estimation with robust standard errors. 
The estimated baseline model, Equation (13), is shown in Column (1) of Table 4. The 
dependent variable is the investment-capital ratio. The coefficients on lagged investment (0.188) 
and sales (0.083) are positive, as expected, and significant at 1 percent level. In the absence of 
financing constraints, firms’ investment is not expected to be positively associated with internal 
funds, here captured by the variable “Cash”. The estimated coefficient on cash, 0.076, is 
significant at 1 percent, suggesting these exchange-listed Chinese firms, on average, experience 
credit constraints.  
To examine the effect of CEO/Chairman’s political background on the firm’s investment 
behavior, cash is interacted with political connection indicators, as shown in Column (2). Firms 
with CEO/Chairman who has powerful political background do not seem to display any 
financing constraints; the coefficient on cash for these firms is 0.025 and statistically 
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insignificant. In contrast, the investment of the firms without politically-connected 
CEO/Chairman is sensitive to internal funds; the cash coefficient for these firms is considerably 
larger, 0.086, and significant at 1 percent. Firms with well-connected top management, due to 
either preferential treatment or perceived implicit government guarantee, may have better access 
to external credits. Non-connected firms are exposed to greater financial frictions arising from 
capital market imperfections. Hence, it is important to understand how financial reforms have 
affected these two groups of firms. 
The financial liberalization index (FLI) is interacted with individual firm’s cash holdings and 
political connection indicator, as in Equation (15). In Column (3) of Table 4, the coefficients on 
the interactive terms indicate that while non-connected firms experience significant financing 
constraints (0.192), financial reforms seem to have reduced the constraints by a large margin (-
0.074). This reduction in the constraints is significant at 1 percent. On the other hand, the 
interactive term of cash and FLI for connected firms is positive (0.049), suggesting these firms 
might have been exposed to greater credit constraints, probably via stricter market disciplines, as 
the financial system becomes more liberalized. However, this term is not statistically significant. 
The regression with capital control index (CCI), specified in Equation (16) and reported in 
Column (4) of Table 4, confirms the results from the FLI regression. The sensitivity of 
investment to internal funds is positively associated with the degree of capital control (0.276) for 
non-connected firms; the coefficient is -0.152 for connected firms. These coefficients suggest 
that lower capital control mitigates credit constraints for the former while exacerbates them for 
the latter.  
Our results suggest that financial liberalization has helped lowering financing constraints for 
firms without politically-connected CEO/Chairman. These firms, relative to their politically-
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connected counterparts, are normally subjected to greater asymmetric information problems and 
transaction costs.5 Such policy reforms as removal of interest rate ceiling, reduction in entry 
barriers into the banking sector (including bank privatization), scaling down of directed credit, 
and opening up capital markets to foreign investors may have promoted greater supply of funds 
in the economy and in turn enhanced access to external credits for these firms. The overall 
effects of these reform measures are found significant in this paper. On the other hand, financial 
liberalization, by gradually eliminating preferential treatment for some firms, can, in principles, 
subject these firms to greater market disciplines and therefore raise their financial constraints. 
There is some evidence to this effect, albeit statistically insignificant, in our paper.  
The empirical evidence obtained in this paper is consistent with that in some recent studies 
on other emerging markets. For example, the results in Gelos and Werner (2002) indicate that 
financial liberalization reduces financial constraints for small firms, but not large ones, in 
Mexico. They argue that large firms might have had political connection and therefore 
preferential treatment in terms of access to external credit before financial deregulation. For 
Korea, Koo and Maeng (2005) find that financial liberalization improves access to external funds 
for financially-constrained firms, small and non-chaebol firms in their paper; there is no such 
gain for large and chaebol firms. Johnston and Mitton (2003) show that the capital controls 
imposed in Malaysia in September 1998 conferred significant gain in terms of stock market 
valuation for Malaysian firms with political tie to the Prime Minister.  
 
                                                          
5 Empirical studies, including those in Table 1, confirm that in other emerging markets, firms that are considered to 
operate at an informational disadvantage and therefore greater financial frictions, such as young or small or non-
affiliated firms, exhibit significant credit constraints. In our sample, these firms are those without political ties. The 
main interest is to understand how financial reforms have affected them.  
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b. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Instead of using a maximum of 2 lags of each explanatory as instruments, we use a maximum 
of 3 lags and report the results in Columns (1) and (2) in Table 5. They are similar to the results 
in Table 4.  
We also try an alternative definition of political connection. Here, a firm is considered to be 
politically-connected if the CEO or Chairman has served in the military service or achieved a 
political ranking at the provincial- or ministerial-level. That is, whether the CEO/Chairman was 
or is a government official is not taken into account. Given stricter criteria, we obtain a smaller 
subset of politically-connected firms. The results in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 reflect this 
change in definition and provide further support to our conclusion made above. The coefficients 
on cash remain insignificant for connected firms and significant for non-connected firms. Since 
some firms considered as politically connected in Table 4 are now classified as non-connected in 
Table 5, the sensitivity of firms’ capital investment with regards to internal funds in this latter 
group is now smaller; the coefficient on cash in the FLI and CCI regression is, respectively, 
0.149 and 0.120 with the new grouping versus 0.192 and 0.276 with the previous grouping. In 
addition, greater financial liberalization and lower restriction in equity market do not seem to 
confer as much benefit to this newly-defined group of non-connected firms; the reduction in the 
investment constraints is 0.049 and 0.176, respectively, in the FLI and CCI regression. The 
comparable figures in the former definition are 0.074 and 0.152. These changes suggest that the 
effect of political connection on the firm’s investment constraints estimated in Table 4 is robust. 
Next, to account for some possible bias resulting from omitting relevant variables, we add 
some control variables to Equations (15) and (16).  In Columns (5) and (6) of Table 5, we report 
the results from regressions that include debt-to-capital ratio to account for the effect of firm’s 
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leverage. Higher leverage is likely to raise the cost of external financing and therefore has 
negative impact on the firm’s investment. The key results in Table 4 are retained here. The 
interaction terms between cash, political connection dummy, and FLI or CCI are of similar 
magnitude and statistical significance. The leverage term does have the expected sign but it is not 
statistically significant. Lastly, firms may hold cash not to guard against liquidity shortage, but in 
anticipation of expected future profits. The coefficient on cash then may fail to reflect investment 
constraints. We include sales growth over capital stock, commonly referred to as “accelerator” 
term, to account for some potential effects of future opportunities on current investment. This 
additional control variable is positive, as expected, and significant at 5 percent level. The results 
for the rest of the explanatory variables are similar to those reported for the baseline model.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
Our paper, using data on Chinese listed-firms, examines a specific channel through which 
financial liberalization can affect economic growth: the impact on firm’s financial constraints. 
We have shown that while overall firms in our sample experience significant credit constraints, 
those with politically-connected CEO/Chairman are free from such constraints. Financial 
reforms in China, including gradually opening up the domestic stock market to foreign investors, 
seem to have reduced some imperfections of the capital markets, measured in terms of reduction 
in credit constraints in this paper, for firms without politically-connected senior management. 
These firms, relative to their connected counterparts, are normally exposed to greater 
informational asymmetries and therefore more costly external financing. They stand to gain from 
more transparent financial system, greater prudential regulations, lower entry barriers to the 
banking sector, and more liberalized interest rates. These reforms have been hypothesized in the 
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literature to increase the supply of savings in the economy and therefore enhance the firm’s 
access to external funds (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973, Obstfeld, 1994). Greater openness of 
stock market to foreign investors in other countries has also been shown to promote investment, 
profitability, and operating performance at the firm level (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Mitton, 
2006). 
Relative to other East Asian economies, China is a late comer in terms of liberalizing its 
domestic financial markets and capital accounts. However, China has recently been willing to 
participate more in both regional and global financial markets and to become a key player in the 
global currency system. Examples include China’s participation in the Chiang Mai Initiative (in 
2000), the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors’ Scheme (2002), the gradual revaluation of 
the Chinese yuan (since 2005), and yuan-denominated offshore bond issues (since 2009) and off-
shore deposit accounts (as of January 2011). Increasing regional trade and persistent high 
economic growth in China have drawn more capital into the country. As a result, greater East 
Asian financial and economic integration is expected to enhance the supply of funds available for 
Chinese firms’ investment.  
A more liberalized domestic financial system is also expected to attract greater foreign direct 
investment into China and hence further contribute to lowering Chinese firms’ financing 
constraints. While having politically-connected senior management still yields economic value 
for some firms, such value is expected to diminish as these connected firms face stronger market 
disciplines along further reforms. Moreover, political connection is closely related to the 
dominance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China, a legacy of earlier central-planning 
system. As the Chinese government continues to push for greater privatization of SOEs and 
encourage the growth of other types of ownership, potential negative effect of firms’ political 
17 
 
connection on growth will diminish and ought to be more than offset by benefits created in a 
more vibrant and diversified economic system. 
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FIGURE 1 
Financial Liberalization Index (FLI) captures cumulative financial reforms in interest rates, entry barriers into 
the banking system, prudential regulations, directed credit, and bank privatization. Larger values indicate more 
liberalized regime. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
Capital Control Index (CCI) measures the degree of capital control in the Chinese equity market; it is equal to 
one minus the portion of the stock market available to foreign investors. Smaller values indicate less restriction.
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TABLE 1 
Summary of Some Recent Studies 
Study Data Financial 
liberalization 
Model and estimation 
method 
Key results 
     
Jaramillo et al. 
(1996) 
Panel data of 420 
Ecuadorian firms, 
1983-1988 
Single binary 
dummy; switch 
date: 1986 
Euler-based 
investment model; 
GMM-difference 
estimator 
No reduction in 
constraints for small 
firms 
 
     
Hermes & 
Lensink (1998) 
Panel of 70 
Chilean firms, 
1983-1992 
Single binary 
dummy; switch 
date: 1987  
Ad hoc investment 
model; fixed-effect 
estimator 
No reduction in 
constraints for small 
firms 
     
Forbes  (2007) Panel of 114 
Chilean firms, 
1988-2001 
Capital control 
imposed during 
1991-98 
Euler-based 
investment model; 
GMM-difference 
estimator 
Small firms experience 
higher constraints during 
capital controls, but not 
before and after 
 
Love (2003) Panel of 5000 
firms in 36 
countries, 1988-
1998 
Continuous 
measure of 
financial 
development 
Euler-based 
investment model; 
GMM-difference 
estimator 
 
Lower constraints for all 
firms, but more so for 
small firms 
Laeven (2003) Panel of firms in 
13 developing 
countries, 1988-
1998 
Average of binary 
indicators for 6 
aspects of financial 
reforms, FLI 
 
Euler-based 
investment model; 
GMM-difference 
estimator 
Lower constraints for 
small firms, higher for 
large firms 
Koo et al. (2005) Panel of 371 listed 
Korean firms 
Continuous FLI is 
an average of 7 
indicators of 
financial reforms 
Euler-based 
investment model; 
GMM-difference 
estimator 
Small and non-chaebol 
firms benefit from 
financial liberalization in 
terms of reduction in the 
financing constraints  
 
TABLE 2 
Definition of Regression Variables 
Variable Description 
Assetst Total assets at the beginning of period t, adjusted for inflation. 
It Investment during t, measured by the value of capital expenditure, scaled by Kt. 
Kt Capital stock at beginning of t, measured as the value of property, plant, and equipment at 
the end of t less investment during t, plus depreciation and amortization expenses 
during t.   
Casht Cash and equivalent at the beginning of period t, scaled by Kt. 
Salest 
Political Connection 
Net sales, scaled by Kt. 
A firm is considered politically connected if its CEO or Chairman is or was a government 
official or military officer or someone with a provincial- or ministerial-level political 
rank. 
Debtt Book value of long- and short-term debt at the beginning of period t. 
Leveraget Ratio of Debtt to Assetst. 
Acceleratort (Salest – Salest-1)/Kt
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TABLE 3 
Average Value for Key Variables Scaled by Capital Stock (2005-2007) 
Variable # of firms Investment Cash Sales 
All firms 1,347 0.229(0.303) 0.767(1.154) 2.510(2.127) 
Connected firms 330 0.195(0.272) 0.693(1.241) 1.986(1.914) 
Non-connected firms 1,017 0.240(0.312) 0.792(1.124) 2.681(2.165) 
Note: In each cell, the first number is the average value expressed as a portion of capital and the number in the 
parenthesis is the standard deviation.  
TABLE 4 
Main Results of the Investment Model. Dependent Variable: Investment (It/Kt) 
 (1) 
Baseline 
(2) 
Political 
connection 
(3) 
FLI 
(4) 
CCI 
Investmentt-1 0.188** 
(0.035) 
0.184** 
(0.035) 
0.150** 
(0.034) 
0.152** 
(0.034) 
Sales 0.083** 
(0.020) 
0.080** 
(0.018) 
0.097** 
(0.024) 
0.091** 
(0.023) 
Cash 0.076** 
(0.019) 
   
Cash*Pol  0.025 
(0.050) 
0.077 
(0.067) 
0.108 
(0.080) 
Cash*Non-pol  0.086** 
(0.020) 
0.192** 
(0.038) 
0.120** 
(0.025) 
Cash*FLI*Pol   0.049 
(0.101) 
 
Cash*FLI*Non-pol   -0.074** 
(0.026) 
 
Cash*CCI*Pol    -0.152 
(0.433) 
Cash*CCI*Non-pol    0.276* 
(0.107) 
Wald testa 66.97** 67.31** 151.60** 96.66**
Serial corrb 1.54 1.51 0.40 0.57 
# firms 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226 
# observations 3,399 3,399 3,399 3,399 
Note: ** and * denote significance at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. The 
dependent variable is investment-to-capital ratio (investment for short). Sales are total sale revenue scaled by capital 
stock; cash is cash holdings scaled by capital stock. The results are obtained by two-step estimation with robust 
standard errors in Arellano and Bond (1991). We use a maximum of 2 lags for each explanatory as instruments.  
a Wald statistic is a test of the joint significance of the explanatory variables.  
b Serial correlation is the z-statistic for testing the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation in the 
residuals.  
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TABLE 5 
Sensitivity Analysis: Using Alternative Lag Length and Definition of Political Connection and Adding Control Variable. Dependent Variable: Investment (It/Kt) 
 Different lag lengtha Political connection 2b Leveraged Acceleratore 
 (1) 
FLI 
(2) 
CCI 
(3) 
FLI 
(4) 
CCI 
(5) 
FLI 
(6) 
CCI 
(7) 
FLI 
(8) 
CCI 
Investmentt-1 0.158** 
(0.034) 
0.158** 
(0.034) 
0.163** 
(0.034) 
0.163** 
(0.034) 
0.146**
(0.018) 
0.148** 
(0.034) 
0.147** 
(0.035) 
0.147** 
(0.035) 
Sales 0.102** 
(0.020) 
0.095** 
(0.019) 
0.102** 
(0.022) 
0.096** 
(0.021) 
0.090**
(0.025) 
0.087** 
(0.023) 
0.050 
(0.034) 
0.047 
(0.030) 
Cash*Pol 0.088 
(0.049) 
0.054 
(0.040) 
0.138 
(0.251) 
-0.086
(0.511) 
0.056 
(0.073) 
0.153 
(0.119) 
0.091 
(0.077) 
0.164 
(0.116) 
Cash*Non-pol 0.179** 
(0.035) 
0.122**
(0.026) 
0.149**
(0.032) 
0.102**
(0.024) 
0.214**
(0.038) 
0.125**
(0.026) 
0.197**
(0.033) 
0.130**
(0.024) 
Cash*FLI*Pol -0.033 
(0.020) 
 -0.103 
(0.225) 
 0.126 
(0.078) 
 0.086 
(0.055) 
 
Cash*FLI*Non-pol -0.060** 
(0.017) 
 -0.049** 
(0.018) 
 -0.092** 
(0.025) 
 -0.070**
(0.015) 
 
Cash*CCI*Pol  0.128 
(0.086) 
 0.687 
(1.080) 
 -0.456 
(0.336) 
 -0.354 
(0.268) 
Cash*CCI*Non-pol  0.233** 
(0.067) 
 0.176* 
(0.079) 
 0.352** 
(0.102) 
 0.279** 
(0.065) 
Control variablec . . . . -0.058 
(0.048) 
-0.057 
(0.050) 
0.031*
(0.013) 
0.031*
(0.014) 
Wald testa 83.42** 84.16** 83.68** 82.73** 102.56** 95.39** 80.19** 78.85** 
Serial corrb 0.66 0.74 0.80 0.81 -0.11 0.12 0.42 0.47 
# firms 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,216 1,216 1,226 1,226 
# observations 3,399 3,399 3,399 3,399 3,366 3,366 3,399 3,399 
Notes: See notes to Table 4.   
a We use a maximum of 3 lags for each explanatory variable as instruments here.  
b Alternative definition of political connection: only military service and political ranking at provincial-level and ministerial-level of the CEOs and Chairmen are 
considered. That is, whether the CEO/Chairman was or is a government official is not taken into account. 
c Coefficient on leverage (d) and accelerator (e) variable. The leverage variable refers the debt-to-capital ratio. The “accelerator” term is defined as sales growth 
over capital stock.  
d To control for the effect of firm’s leverage on investment, a ratio of total debt to assets is added to the model.  
e Sales growth over capital stock is included to model accelerator effects. 
